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ABSTRACT 
 
We study the process of growth and business cycles in an open economy which 
has access to international financial markets. The financial market imperfection 
originates from costly state verification and a positive probability of default on loans. 
The degree of credit market imperfection is endogenously derived. The results show 
that developed economies are able to borrow on easier terms than emerging countries. 
The credit market imperfection may cause some economies to fall into a development 
trap if the initial endowment of capital is too low. The financial market frictions also 
generate interesting business cycle dynamics. Financial market imperfections help 
in replicating the empirical fact that output growth shows positive autocorrelation 
at short horizons. The model also predicts that a poorer economy will experience 
a more severe and persistent e.ect on investment and output due to an exogenous 
shock. 
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a framework to study the role of credit market imper-
fections in the process of growth and business cycles in an economy. Econo-
mists have long regarded the credit market as key to understanding economic
development and to transmitting cyclical shocks through modern industrial
economies.
The literature on the connection between credit markets and the macro-
economy has developed in two directions. The growth branch of this literature
started with Gurley and Shaw([14]) who noted that economic growth is al-
most always accompanied by financial deepening, i.e., by more extensive use
of external finance in investment and the gradual easing of distortions of the
credit market. Subsequent papers in this literature have focused on the role of
credit markets as eﬃcient allocators of savings into productive investment op-
portunities. Bencivenga and Smith([3]) studied the growth eﬀects of financial
intermediation in an overlapping generation economy with agents characterized
by uncertain liquidity needs. Intermediation enhances growth because banks
are eﬃcient providers of liquidity which frees the individuals from the need to
hold low yield liquid assets. Greenwood and Jovanovic([12]) also derive similar
results. For a summary of the work in this area see Greenwood and Smith([13]).
The cyclical fluctuation branch of the literature focuses on the connection
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between credit markets and business cycles. The main focus of attention is how
the credit market propagates and amplifies external shocks through the econ-
omy. This general sentiment dates back to Fisher and, Friedman and Schwartz,
who argued that adverse conditions in financial markets may have worsened the
eﬀects of prewar recessions, including the Great Depression. Much of business
cycle research investigates the informational role played by the credit markets.
A seminal contribution in this line of research was made by Brenanke and
Gertler([4]). They developed a general equilibrium model where agency costs
arise endogenously. An important insight of their model is the theoretical pos-
sibility that agency costs will enhance the propagation of productivity shocks.
Carlstrom and Fuerst([6]) built on the Bernanke-Gertler paper by constructing
a computable general equilibrium model. They try to quantitatively capture
the eﬀect of agency costs on business cycles.
A related attempt to model credit market imperfection is provided by Keo-
taki andMoore([15]). They analyze the contracting problem between borrowers
and lenders in an environment where value of a project cannot be extracted by
the lender due to inalienability of human capital. The result is that borrowing
is so tightly constrained by the value of collateral that default never occurs in
equilibrium.
We follow Bernanke-Gertler approach and adopt costly state verification
model of Townsend([17]). Our model diﬀers from the earlier papers in the
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literature in three important respects. Firstly, we study the eﬀect of agency
costs in an economy which has access to international financial markets. Un-
like Bernanke & Gertler, and Carlstrom & Fuerst, the economy does not face
an absolute borrowing constraint from domestic savings. Secondly, the agency
cost problem exists in the production of final good and not in the production
of intermediate goods alone. Finally, the inter-temporal preferences are deter-
mined endogenously. This makes the evolution of the economy dependant on
its history. It also provides us with an insight as to why economies diﬀer in
terms of their credit market institutions over a long period of time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the pro-
duction technology and the interaction between investment and international
credit market. The inter-temporal optimization problem of the economy is
presented in section 3. In section 4, we characterize the steady states and
their stability properties. In section 5, we simulate the behavior of an economy
whose characteristics are similar to a standard real business cycle economy and
study the eﬀect of exogenous shocks on it. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
A: The Production technology
Consider an economy with two production sectors. Both the production sectors
3
produce the same homogeneous product, which can be used for consumption or
investment. For tractability we will name the production sectors as household
(H) and industrial (I). The household sector of the economy is characterized
by a simple but primitive technology, which requires only labor for production.
The production function in this sector is given by
Y H = aLH , (1)
where LH denotes the labor input and “a” denotes the marginal productivity
of labor. The industrial sector uses capital (K) and labor(L) simultaneously.
Production in the industrial sector can be thought of as a project or an endeavor
to come up with a new technology. If the project is successful then production
is high but if the project is unsuccessful then output is zero. The production
function in the industrial sector is given by
Y I =



F (LI) with probability π(KI)
0 with probability 1− π(KI)
(2)
where LI and KI are the amount of labor and capital inputs respectively. The
probability of success of the project is an increasing function of the amount of
capital invested.
B: Industrial Sector Investment and the International credit market
The international credit market revolves around a risk free asset which yields a
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gross returnR∗ ≥ 1 which we will call the world interest rate. The international
credit market consists of a large number of potential lenders so all lenders on
average earn R∗ on their loans.
Let us begin with the case when an industrial sector firm decides to borrow
capital from the international market. Suppose the firm is endowed with K
units of capital. The firm has the option of investing in its own industrial
sector project or the risk free asset. In addition he can also borrow capital
from international market at a lending rate of interest Rl. The firm can invest
KI units of capital out of its endowment in the industrial sector project and
earn R∗ on the remaining capital. The amount KI is the owners equity in the
project and is observed by everyone. Suppose the firm borrows B from the
international credit market. The firm could in theory use BI for the industrial
project and invest the remaining amount in the risk free asset. This allocation
of borrowed funds is not ex-ante observed by the international lender.
The optimal contract between the firm and the international lender is a
standard debt contract where the firm repays the lender a gross interest rate
of Rl on each unit of borrowed capital if the firm announces that the project
was successful. If the agent announces that the project was unsuccessful the
lender must take over the project and verify that the firms’s announcement
was truthful. The takeover of project and subsequent verification of the status
of the project is essential to prevent strategic defaulting. Let the verification
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cost to the lender on a loan size of B be mB1. On takeover of the project the
lender is able to retrieve the amount of borrowed capital, which the firm had
diverted into the risk-free asset R∗(B − BI). The limited liability clause in
the debt contract prevents the lender from attaching other sources the agent’s
income on the takeover of the project. Hence the zero profit condition for the
lenders in the international market can be written as
π(KI +BI) RlB + [1− π(KI +BI)] [R∗(B −BI)−mB] = R∗B . (3)
Simple manipulation of equation (3) yields
Rl = R∗
·
1 +
1− π(KI +BI)
π(KIt +BI)
µ
BIt
Bt
¶¸
+
·
1− π(KIt +BIt )
π(KIt +BIt )
¸
m . (4)
Thus the economy can borrow capital from the international credit market
as long as they pay the break-even interest rate to the lenders Rl > R∗. Given
the contractual setup the only situation when the agent is going to declare
bankruptcy is when the project has been unsuccessful. The diﬀerence between
the lending rate and the risk-free interest rate is the interest premium. Let us
now study the borrowing and investment decision of the domestic agent.
Assumption 1: The functions F(.) and π(.) are increasing and strictly concave
in their arguments. In addition lim
L→0
F 0(.) = ∞ , and lim
K→0
π0(.) = ∞; where
F 0(.) and π0(.) denote the derivatives of functions F (.) and π(.) respectively.
1This means that monitoring cost is constant for every unit of loan. We make this
assumption as this is the usual assumption in the literature. Relaxing this assumption
however, will not alter our results significantly.
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Assumption 1 ensures some amount of investment in the industrial sector
firm is worthwhile in the sense that it yields positive expected return.
Proposition 1 If the industrial sector firm borrows in the international credit
market then the entire borrowing is invested in the industrial project.
Proof: See the appendix.
Once the lenders internalize this fact they will be willing to lend at a rate given
by
Rl = R
∗
π(KI +B) +
·
1− π(KI +B)
π(KI +B)
¸
m. (5)
Proposition 2 The firm will never borrow and lend simultaneously in the
international credit market. All debt contracts exhibit maximum equity partic-
ipation i.e., KI = K.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition behind the above result is that the benefit to the firm from
investing the entire capital in the project in terms of being able to borrow at a
lower interest rate outweighs the gain in income from the risk-free asset. Thus
proposition 2 establishes that the economy will save in the risk-free asset if it
does not need to borrow from the international credit market. The borrowing
interest rate in the international credit market is given by
Rl = R
∗
π(K +B) +
·
1− π(K +B)
π(K +B)
¸
m . (6)
Having derived some basic results concerning the working of the credit market
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let us now see how the aggregate economy behaves. Suppose the economy
consists of a continuum of identical industrial sector firms of unit measure.
The economy consists of a representative agent who is endowed with L units
of labor in every period. The agent invests his capital equally among the
industrial sector firms and at the end of each period receives dividends from the
successful firms. In each period π(.) proportion of the firms will be successful.
The proportion of the successful firms in each period depends on the amount
of investment in the industrial sector project. Depending on the amount of
capital the agent brings into period t the economy will either borrow or lend
in the credit market. This decision will in turn determine the inter-temporal
budget constraint of the agent and then determine the long run output of the
economy. Let Kt denote the amount of capital brought into period t by the
agent. The aggregate production function of the economy is
Y (Kt) = π(KIt +Bt)[F (LIt )−RltBt] + a(L− LIt ) +R∗(Kt −KIt ).
Proposition 3 Let K∗ be solution to π0(K)F (LI) = R∗. If Kt ∈ [0, K∗) then
KIt = Kt and Bt > 0. If Kt ∈ [ K∗,∞) then KIt ≤ Kt and Bt = 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
When the capital brought into period t by the agent is suﬃciently small the
agent will borrow from the credit market. Also, from equation (6) we can
see that if the capital endowment of the agent is high the interest premium is
8
lower. This corresponds well with the fact that industrialized economies find it
easier to borrow funds in comparison to emerging economies. Once the return
from investment in the industrial sector project falls below the rate of return
on the risk free asset the agent will become a lender in the international credit
market.
The domestic agent when faced with a lending rate Rlt will borrow until
π0(Kt +Bt)F (LIt )
π(Kt +Bt) + π0(Kt +Bt)Bt
= Rlt. (7)
Equation (7)2implies the level of investment in the industrial project is decreas-
ing in the lending rate. The amount of investment in the industrial project
when the agent has to borrow from the international credit market is less than
the first-best3.
In any period t, the agent also decides on the amount of labor and the
capital to employ in the industrial sector, and weather to borrow or lend in
the international credit market. From assumption 1, the optimal allocation of
labor across the industrial and household sector will satisfy
π(KIt +Bt)F 0(LIt ) = a
2For detailed derivation of this condition see Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.
3The first best level of investment will be given by the solution to π0(Kt +
Bt)F (LIt ) = R∗. According to equation (7) the demand for credit from the agent satis-
fies π
0(Kt+Bt)F (LIt )
π(Kt+Bt)+π0(Kt+Bt)Bt = R
l
t. Rlt > R∗ and
π0(Kt+Bt)F (LIt )
π(Kt+Bt)+π0(Kt+Bt)Bt < π
0(Kt + Bt)F (LIt ),
hence the level of investment is less than first best.
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if LIt < L. Hence, LIt is an increasing function of the amount of investment
in the industrial sector (KIt + Bt). Let us write the labor employed in the
industrial sector as LI(Kt+Bt). From Proposition 3 we know that the economy
will borrow if Kt < K∗ and the entire capital stock will be invested in the
industrial sector. Therefore from equation (7) we can write Bt as a function of
Kt. Once the economy attains K∗ units of capital it will stop borrowing from
the international credit market and invest any additional amount of capital
i.e., (Kt −K∗) in the risk free asset. To save on notation, in the subsequent
analysis LIt and Bt will refer to the optimal choice of labor and borrowing given
the level of capital.
Proposition 4 If Kt ∈ [0, K∗) then total investment in the industrial sector
is increasing in Kt.
Proof: See the appendix.
When an economy is a borrower in the international credit market, the lending
rate of interest will decrease as the capital stock of the economy increases. As
a result the level of investment in the industrial sector increases with the level
of capital.
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3 Inter-temporal optimization
Now we study the inter-temporal problem faced by the economy. In order to
ensure the existence of at least one steady state equilibrium we assume the
agent’s preferences are characterized by endogenous rate of time preference.
One way of interpreting these preferences is to view the discount factors as
an agents probability of surviving to the next period4. The agent given the
initial endowment of capital, has to decide his consumption and savings. The
discount factor between periods t and t+ 1(ρt,t+1) is a continuous function of
consumption at time t in the following way:
ρt,t+1 = β(Ct) (8)
where 0 < β(Ct) < 1.
Let the period utility function of the agent be U(Ct). The maximization
problem faced by the agent is
maxE0
∞X
t=0
ρ0,t U(Ct) ,
subject to
Kt+1 = Y (Kt)− Ct , (9)
4For a detaled discussion of the preferences used below see Chakrabarty([7]).
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Y (Kt) = max
KIt ,LIt
π(KIt +Bt)[F (LIt )−RltBt] + a(L− LIt ) +R∗(Kt −KIt ), (10)
and a transversality condition
lim
t−→∞
ρ0,tKt ≥ 0 . (TC)
At this point we make some assumptions concerning the functions U(.) and
β(.) to ensure that the necessary conditions for maximum are also suﬃcient.
Assumption 2: U(Ct) > 0, U 0(Ct) > 0, U 00(Ct) < 0, and β00(Ct) < 0 < β0(Ct)
for all Ct.
Let Rt denote the rate of return on capital in period t. From Proposition 3,
we have
Rt =



R∗ + [1− π(Kt +Bt)]m if Kt ∈ [0, Kh),
R∗ if Kt ∈ [Kh,∞).
The solution to the economy’s optimization problem will satisfy the following
diﬀerence equations5.
U 0(Ct) + β0(Ct) φt+1
β(Ct)[U 0(Ct+1) + β0(Ct+1) φt+2]
= β(Ct)Rt+1, (11)
φt = U(Ct) + β(Ct)φt+1 for all t ≥ 1, (12)
5See the appendix for a detailed derivation.
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and (9). The variable φt+1 is the present discounted value of future consump-
tion from period t+ 1 onwards6.
Definition 1 A rational expectation equilibrium(REE) of this economy are
sequences {Ct}∞t=0, {Kt+1}∞t=0, {KIt }∞t=0, {LIt}∞t=1, {φt}∞t=1, {Bt}∞t=1 such that
(9), (11), (12) and TC hold for a given K0.
Equation (9) is the inter-temporal budget constraint of the agent. Equation
(11) tells us that the loss in welfare due to foregoing consumption in period t
has to equal the discounted value of gain in welfare from period t+1 onwards.
This condition is commonly referred to as the Fisher equation.
4 Steady-State Equilibria and Stability
Let us first study the steady state solutions to the diﬀerence equations (9),
(11), (12) . In a steady state, equations (9), (11) and (12)reduce to
C = Y (K)−K , (BC)
β(C)R(K) = 1, (RR)
and
6φt+1 =
∞P
s=t+1
ρt+1,sU(Cs)
13
φ = U(C)
1− β(C) , (13)
where R(K) = max{R∗+ [1− π(K +B)]m, R∗}. Equation (RR) is the steady
state counterpart of the Fisher’s inter-temporal optimum. Equation (BC) gives
us the locus of points along which the agent’s consumption and capital stock
are constant and satisfy the budget constraint. The (BC) curve is increasing
in the level of capital7. The slope of RR curve in consumption-capital plane is
given by −R
0(K)β(C)2
β0(C) which is positive when K ∈ [0, K∗). When K ∈ [K∗,∞)
the (RR) curve is a horizontal line. Now we characterize the steady states and
their stability properties.
Proposition 5 If β−1( 1R(0)) < Y (0) and β
−1( 1R∗ ) > Y (K∗) −K∗ then there
exists at least one steady state level of capital stock K ∈ [0, K∗) which is locally
unique.
Proof: See the appendix.
The proposition above establishes a suﬃcient condition for the existence of
at least one stable steady state equilibrium. The condition in the proposition
means that when an economy has no capital the discount factor should be suf-
ficiently high to induce the economy to save and accumulate capital. Note that
it is possible that there may be more than one stable steady state equilibria.
7Using the envelope theorem, the slope of BC curve is π0(K + B)Rl − 1 if K ∈ [0,K∗)
and R∗ − 1 if K ∈ [K∗,∞). Hence the slope of the BC curve is always positive.
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5 Simulation
In this section we study the behavior of a simulated economy whose charac-
teristics are similar to a standard international business cycle model except for
the credit market imperfection. We assume that the period utility and discount
factor are of the following functional forms:
U(C) = C
1−σ
1− σ , σ > 1,
β(C) = β − (β − β)e−δC , where β > β > 0 and δ > 0.
The production functions in the industrial and household sectors are
F (L) = ALθ and Y H = aL
respectively. The probability of success of an industrial sector project is
π(K +B) =



τ(K +B)α if 0 < K +B < τ− 1α
1 if K +B > τ− 1α
where τ < 1. From the first-order condition for optimal allocation of labor, the
amount of labor employed in the industrial sector is given by
LI =



(Aτθa )(K +B)
α
1−θ if K < L,
L otherwise.
The level of capital when the economy starts lending in the international credit
market K∗ = ( cR∗ )
1−θ
1−α−θ , where c = ατA(Aτθa )
θ
1−θ . Note that as long as K∗ <
τ− 1α the economy which borrows from the international credit market will have
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to pay an interest premium. These functional forms yield us a Cobb-Douglas
production function for the industrial sector. We now simulate the economy
using certain parameter values which are presented in Table 1. The relationship
between capital stock of the economy and the lending rate is given in Figure
1a. The corresponding optimal level of borrowing is shown in Figure 1b. The
solution to inter-temporal maximization problem of the economy shows the
possibility of two stable steady state equilibria. The function g(K) = β(Y (K)−
K)R(K) − 1 is shown in figure 2. If the initial endowment of capital of the
economy is less thanKu the economy converges to the poverty trap steady state
Kp. If the initial endowment of capital exceeds Ku the economy converges to
the high level steady stateKh. Some characteristics of the two steady states are
summarized in Table 2. Understandably the poverty trap steady state shows a
lower share of industrial sector in GDP. The debt-equity ratio(B/K) is higher
for Kp. We now study the impact of a small productivity and interest rate
shock on these economies. These shocks are assumed to follow the following
processes:
bR∗t = 0.9 bR∗t−1 + υR,
bAt = 0.95 bAt−1 + υA,
around their steady state values, where υR and υA are serially uncorrelated
shocks to world interest rate and productivity respectively.
The impulse response functions for capital and output due to a 1% produc-
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tivity shock are shown in Figures 3a and 3b. Both the steady state economies
experience amplification and persistence. This is due to the credit market fric-
tion. Figures 4a and 4b are the deviation in capital and output from their
steady state values due to a 1% shock to the world interest rate. Interestingly
the eﬀect on the poverty trap steady state is more severe and persistent.
This behavior of the impulse response functions is similar to Carlstrom
and Fuerst([6]). However, in their model an economic expansion is associated
with an increase in risk premium and bankruptcy rates. Our model predicts
a lowering of risk premium and bankruptcy rates during periods of expansion.
This is due to the fact that in our model economies can borrow from the foreign
markets and are not constrained my domestic savings.
6 Conclusion
We develop a model of imperfect credit markets where an economy has access to
foreign capital markets and potentially can borrow unlimited amount of funds.
On a purely theoretical level this adds to the present literature by allowing the
economy to borrow beyond domestic savings. In conjunction with endogenous
rate of time preference this paper explains why history of an economy matters
in the process of development. The model also predicts hump shaped impulse
response functions: a well established empirical fact(see for example Cogley
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and Nason([8])).
In future work we would like to carefully calibrate the parameters of the
model to quantitatively evaluate the predictions of the model. In this paper
we have played down the role of the banking system. Explicit modeling of the
banking system will not alter our results as there is no aggregate uncertainty in
the economy. Introduction of aggregate uncertainty in the production process
may lead to phenomenon such as banking crisis and self fulfilling expectations.
The role of banking system would become important in such a scenario. Such
issues are left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We want to show that if B > 0 then BI = B . If the firm decides to borrow
funds from the international capital market it maximizes expected income i.e.,
max
B,BI ,KI
π(KI +BI)[F (LI) +R∗(B −BI)−RlB] +R∗(K −KI),
with respect to B and BI . If B > 0 and BI < B, then it is possible to increase
the expected income of the agent by reducing B since Rl > R∗ which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We want to show that if B > 0 then KI = K. Incorporating the previous
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proposition we can re-write the expected income of the agent as
max
B,BI ,KI
π(KI +B)[F (LI)−RlB] +R∗(K −KI).
If B > 0 then π0(KI+B)[F (LI)−RlB]−π(KI+B) Rl ≥ 0. Suppose KI < K
then π0(KI + B)F (LI) = R∗. Substituting this in the previous inequality we
get that R∗−RlB−π(KI+B)Rl ≥ 0. Substituting (6) and carrying out simple
manipulation we get that for the B > 0 and KI < K to hold simultaneously
−RlB − [1− π(KI +B)]m has to be non-negative which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The expected income of the domestic agent in period t is
Y (Kt) = π(KIt +Bt)[F (LIt )−RltBt] + a(L− LIt ) +R∗(Kt −KIt ).
First order conditions for optimum with respect to LIt yields
π(KIt +Bt)F 0(LIt ) ≥ a.
LIt > 0 from our assumptions and is increasing in (KIt +Bt) as long as LIt < L.
Therefore we can write LIt = L(KIt + Bt); where L0(.) > 0 if LIt < L and
L0(.) = 0 otherwise. Let K∗ be solution to π0(K)F (LI) = R∗. We want to
show if Kt ≥ K∗ then Bt = 0. If Kt ≥ K∗ then π0(Kt + Bt)F (LIt ) − π0(Kt +
Bt)Bt − π(Kt + Bt)Rlt ≤ R∗ − π0(Kt + Bt)Bt − π(Kt + Bt)Rlt < 0 implying
borrowing will lower expected income. Hence Bt = 0 when Kt ≥ K∗. Using
Proposition 2, optimal choice of Bt after some manipulations can be written
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as
π0(Kt +Bt)F (LIt )
π(Kt +Bt) + π0(Kt +Bt)Bt
−Rlt ≥ 0 if Bt > 0.
Notice the first order condition for maximum is also suﬃcient since π00(Kt +
Bt)[F (LIt )−Rlt]−2π0(Kt+Bt)Rlt < 0. Define z(B,Kt) =
π0(Kt+B)F (LIt )
π(Kt+B)+π0(Kt+B)B−R
l
t.
If Kt < K∗ then z(0,Kt) = π
0(Kt)F (LIt )
π(Kt) −R
∗ > 0. Hence optimal Bt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The optimal level of borrowing by an economy with capital less than K∗ solves
π0(Kt +Bt)F (LIt )− π0(Kt +Bt)Bt − π(Kt +Bt)Rlt = 0.
The condition above gives the borrowing function Bt = B(Kt). B
0
(K) = dBdK
= π
00
(K+B)[F (LI)−RlB]−π0(Kt+Bt)Rlt
π00 (K+B)[F (LI)−RlB]−2π0(Kt+Bt)Rlt
> −1. Therefore total investment Kt+Bt
is increasing in Kt.
Inter-temporal Optimization problem of the economy:
The Lagrangian for the agent’s problem can be written as
$ =
∞X
t=0
{ρ0,t U(Ct) + eλt[Yt − Ct −Kt+1]} .
The first-order conditions for maximum are
ρ0,tU 0(Ct) +
∞X
s=t+1
∂ρ0,s
∂Ct
U(Cs) = eλt ,
eλt = eλt+1Rt+1,
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and the transversality condition holding with equality. Let
µ eλt
ρ0,t
¶
= λt and
∞P
s=t+1
ρt+1,sU(Cs) = φt+1 , where φt+1 is the present discounted value of future
consumption from period t+1 onwards. The first order conditions can now be
re-written as
U 0(Ct) + β0(Ct) φt+1 = λt , (14)
λt = λt+1β(Ct)Rt+1, (15)
and
Kt+1 = Yt − Ct . (16)
Substituting (14) in (15) we get,
U 0(Ct) + β0(Ct) φt+1
β(Ct)[U 0(Ct+1) + β0(Ct+1) φt+2]
= β(Ct)Rt+1 (17)
Notice that the variable φt, the present discounted value of utilities from period
t onwards, evolves in the following fashion:
φt = U(Ct) + β(Ct) φt+1 for all t ≥ 1 . (18)
Proof of Proposition 5:
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Define g(K) = β(C)R(K)−1. Substituting (BC) for C, g(0) = β(Y (0))R(0)−
1 > 0 if β−1( 1R(0)) > Y (0) and g(K∗) = β(Y (K∗)−K∗)R∗−1 < 0 if β
−1( 1R∗ ) <
Y (K∗) − K∗. Then there must exist a Ks ∈ [0, K∗) such that g(Ks) = 0.
Moreover the derivative of the function g(.) along that steady state is g0(Ks) =
β0(C)R(Ks)(R(Ks)− 1) + β(C)R0(Ks) < 0. To study the stability properties
of the steady state, we first log-linearize equation (9), (12) and (11) around
steady state which yields
bKt+1 = β−1 bKt + s1 bCt, (19)
where ‘^’ denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state
value and s1 = −C/K at steady state. Log-linearization of (12) gives us
bφt+1 = −− β−1∆2 bCt + −β−1bφt (20)
where β(C) =
µ
β0(C) C
β(C)
¶
> 0 , U(C) =
µ
U 0(C) C
U(C)
¶
> 0 and ∆2 = (1 −
β)U(C) + ββ(C) > 0.We rewrite the above equation as
bφt+2 − bφt+1 = −β−1∆2 bCt+1 + ( β−1 − 1) bφt+1, (21)
to simplify our analysis in future. From (14), we have
[s2σ(C) + s3ηβ(C)φ] bCt + s3 bφt+1 = bλt,
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where σ(C) =
µ
U 00(C) C
U 0(C)
¶
< 0 and ηβ(C) =
µ
β00(C) C
β0(C)
¶
< 0. s2 =
µ
U 0(C)
λ
¶
and s3 = 1− s2. We write the above equation more compactly as
∆1 bCt + s3 bφt+1 = bλt, (22)
where ∆1 = [s2σ(C) + s3ηβ(C)φ] < 0, from our previous assumptions.
From (15) we have
bλt − bλt+1 = β(C) bCt +R0(K) bKt+1 (23)
We can now use equations (19), (20), (21), (22) and (23) to write a system
of diﬀerence equations in bCt, bφt and bKt where the dynamical system can be
expressed as


bCt+1
bφt+1
bKt+1


=M


bCt
bφt
bKt


, (24)
where
M =


M11 M12 M13
−β−1∆2 β−1 0
s1 0 β−1


,
M11 =
µ
β(2− β−1) + s1R0(K)K −∆1
β −∆1
¶
, M12 =
µ
β(β−1 − 1)∆−12
β −∆1
¶
and
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M13 =
µ
R0(K)Kβ−1
β −∆1
¶
. The eigenvalues of matrix M are going to determine
the local behavior of the system.
The roots of the polynomial det[M − µI] = 0, will determine the behavior of
the above system.
det[M − µI] = (β−1 − µ)[(M11 − µ)(β−1 − µ) +M12β−1∆2 − s1M13] .
Therefore µ1 = β−1 is one of the roots of the polynomial. The other two roots
of det[M − µI] are the roots of the polynomial,
P (µ) = µ2 − (M11 + β−1)µ+ (M11β−1 +M12β−1∆2 − s1M13).
Consider (M11β−1 +M12β−1∆2 − s1M13) = β−1
(
β+β(1−β−1)+s1R0(K)K−∆1+ β(β−1−1)−s1R0(K)K
β−∆1 ) = β
−1. Therefore P (0) = β−1 >
1. P (1) = 1−M11−β−1+β−1 = 1−M11 = β(β
−1−1)−s1R0(K)K
β−∆1 < 0 if β(β
−1−1)−
s1R0(K)K < 0.Note that if g0(Ks) = β0(C)R(Ks)(R(Ks)−1)+β(C)R0(Ks) < 0
it implies that β(β−1 − 1) − s1R0(K)K < 0. Hence there exists at least one
root of the polynomial det[M − µI] which is less than one. Its easy to show
that the third root is strictly greater than unity in absolute value. Hence the
steady state is a saddle path and locally unique.
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Table 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value Description 
R* 1.025 World interest rate(per annum) 
m 0.005 Average monitoring Cost 
τ 0.1 Shift parameter for probability of success of 
industrial sector projects 
α 0.53 Elasticity of “probability of success” with 
respect to investment in the industrial sector 
θ 0.26 Elasticity of output with respect to labor in the 
industrial sector 
A 34 Shift parameter in the industrial sector 
production function 
a 1 Labor productivity in household sector 
−
β 0.40 Lower bound of the discount factor 
_β
0.99 Upper bound of the discount factor 
δ 0.03 -[β′′(C)/β′(C)] 
σ 1.5 Elasticity of marginal utility  
Table 2: Some steady state characteristics
B/K YI/Y RlB/F(LI) C/Y β(C) Rl
Kp 70.22 75.93 17.64 77.39 0.89 1.10 
Kh 21.99 87.04 8.56 63.80 0.90 1.05 
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Figure 1a: Lending Rate
R l
K0
Figure 1b: Borrowing
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Figure 2: Steady States
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Figure 3a: IRF for capital due to a 1% productivity shock 
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Figure 3b: IRF for output due to a 1% productivity shock
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Figure 4a: IRF for capital due to a interest rate shock
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Figure 4b: IRF for output due to a interest rate shock
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